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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the problems commonly associated with the joint enterprise 
doctrine might be alleviated by supplementing the cognitive mens rea standard of 
foresight with a volitional element that looks to how the defendant related to the 
foreseen risk. A re-examination of the case law suggests that a mens rea conception of 
foresight plus endorsement might be within interpretative reach. The paper considers 
possible objections to such a development but ultimately rejects them. It concludes 
that it is not necessary to wait for Parliament to put in place reforms: joint enterprise 
is a creature of the common law, and the common law is able to tame it unaided.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two individuals, P and S, are engaged in the burglary of V1’s house. They gain 
access by prying open the back door with a metal bar which P then continues to carry 
with him. When surprisingly they come across the householder, P fears that V1’s cries 
for help will alarm the neighbours. To silence him, he hits V1 forcefully on the head 
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with the metal bar, realising that in doing so he is virtually certain to cause V1 serious 
harm. V1 dies of his injuries.
1
 
Later that day, P and S take part in a fight between rival gangs. While S 
expects a fist fight aimed at ‘teaching’ their rivals ‘a lesson’, he is aware that P, whom 
he now knows to be of a violent disposition, is still carrying the metal bar. As things 
become more heated, P uses the bar to hit V2 ferociously on the head. V2 dies. 
There is little doubt that P has committed murder in both instances. He has caused the 
death of another person with the requisite mental state for murder: as was confirmed 
in Woollin,
2
 murder does not require that the murderer act with intent to kill. It is 
sufficient that the act of killing was done with intent to inflict serious injury.
3
 
But what about S? Is he also guilty of murder? On both occasions, P and S 
were jointly involved in a criminal venture (burglary, assault). They were associates 
in crime. However, on neither occasion had they set out to commit murder 
specifically. If murder had been on their minds, there would be little difficulty in 
holding them both to account for V1’s and V2’s deaths: P as the perpetrator and S as a 
secondary party on the basis of aiding and abetting contrary to s. 8 of the Accessories 
and Abettors Act 1861 (for S encouraged P to kill V1 and V2).
4
 
In the above examples things are different, however, in that the purpose crime 
(burglary, assault) differs from the one that P and S are now accused of (murder). In a 
deviation from their common plan or purpose (burglary, assault), P has killed another 
                                                 
1
 Similar examples are discussed in Hyde [1991] 1 Q.B. 134 (CA) 138D and Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, 
[2012] 1 A.C. 827 at [14]. 
2
 [1999] 1 A.C. 81 (HL). 
3
 Cunningham [1982] A.C. 566 (HL). 
4
 See Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 A.C. 129 at [33] (Lord Rodger): ‘[I]f A and B agree to kill 
their victim and proceed to attack him with that intention, they are both guilty of murder, irrespective 
of who struck the fatal blow. In Lord Hoffmann’s words (Brown v The State [2003] UKPC 10, para 
13), they are engaged in a “plain vanilla” joint enterprise.’ 
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person, albeit that each murder was committed on the occasion of, and hence 
incidentally to, carrying out the purpose crime.  
The issue thus raised by the above examples is whether S is liable for a murder 
committed by P incidentally to their joint criminal venture (which was aimed at the 
commission of a crime other than murder). English common law gives an affirmative 
answer to this question, provided that S was engaged in the joint criminal enterprise 
realising that P might commit murder as a corollary offence (which requires S to have 
foreseen that P might attack V1 and V2 with the requisite mens rea, i.e. intent to kill 
or to cause them serious personal injury).
5
  
In the case law, the purpose crime is commonly referred to as ‘crime A’ and 
the incidental crime as ‘crime B’,6 while the imposition of liability on S for P’s crime 
B has come to be known as the doctrine of joint enterprise
7
 or parasitic accessory 
liability.
8
 Most agree that, while of great importance in practice, this doctrine is far 
from satisfactory: most academic commentary portrays it in overwhelmingly negative 
terms.
9
 Even the courts, while insisting it is still good law, find the principle wanting 
in some respects.
10
 While the Law Commission and the House of Commons Justice 
                                                 
5
 Powell [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL); Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 A.C. 129; Mendez and Thompson 
[2010] EWCA Crim 516, [2011] Q.B. 876; A and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622, [2011] Q.B. 841; 
Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1397, [2012] Q.B. 160; Carpenter [2011] EWCA Crim 2568; Gnango 
[2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 A.C. 827; Jogee [2013] EWCA Crim 1433; Odegbune [2013] EWCA Crim 
711; Winston and Collins [2015] EWCA Crim 524. 
6
 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 A.C. 827 at [42] (Lord Phillips PSC and Lord Judge CJ); A and 
others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622, [2011] Q.B. 841 at [27] (Hughes LJ). 
7
 G. Virgo, “The doctrine of joint enterprise liability” (2010) Archbold Review 6. 
8
 The Supreme Court adopted this term (coined by Professor Sir John Smith) in Gnango [2011] UKSC 
59, [2012] 1 A.C. 827 at [15]. 
9
 See e.g. C.M.V. Clarkson, “Complicity, Powell and manslaughter” [1998] Crim. L.R. 556, 557-558; 
G. Virgo, “The doctrine of joint enterprise liability” (2010) Archbold Review 6, 9; G. Virgo, “Joint 
enterprise liability is dead: long live accessorial liability” [2012] Crim. L.R. 850, 854; W. Wilson and 
D. Ormerod, “Simply harsh to fairly simple: joint enterprise reform” [2015] Crim. L.R. 3, 5-21; B. 
Crewe and others, “Joint enterprise: the implications of an unfair and unclear law” [2015] Crim. L.R. 
252-269. 
10
 Powell [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 11 (Lord Mustill), 25 (Lord Hutton). 
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Committee have recommended statutory reform as a matter of some urgency,
11
 
successive Justice Secretaries have expressed little enthusiasm for following this 
advice.
12
 It therefore now seems rather unlikely that the doctrine will be reformed by 
statute, so that, if change is to happen, it is for the courts to bring this about. The 
Supreme Court has just agreed to hear the appeal in the joint enterprise murder case of 
Jogee.
13
 The hearing will take place later this year and presents the Supreme Court 
with an opportunity fundamentally to review the law in this area. Against this 
backdrop, this article will explore whether the contentious features of the joint 
enterprise principle could be improved by way of common law development. 
On one view, now dominant in the case law,
14
 joint enterprise represents a 
distinct, judge-made form of liability for participants in crime which exists alongside 
aiding and abetting under s. 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 and joint 
perpetration. In other words, it is used as a principle of inculpation. I have argued 
elsewhere that, both as a matter of history and principle, it is preferable to regard it as 
a principle of exculpation, delineating the boundaries of liability for aiding and 
abetting and joint perpetration.
15
 On either view, the threshold for liability as it is 
                                                 
11
 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide – Project 6 of the Ninth Programme of 
Law Reform: Homicide (Law Com No 304, 2006); Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law 
Com No 305, 2007); House of Commons Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise – Eleventh Report of 
Session 2010-12, vol I (HC 1597, 2012); House of Commons Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise: 
follow-up – Fourth Report of Session 2014-15 (HC 310, 2014). 
12
 Kenneth Clarke indicated that the Committee’s recommendations in relation to consulting on new 
legislation would not be taken up in the foreseeable future, see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmjust/1901/190104.htm (accessed 21 May 2015). Chris Grayling was even 
less sympathetic, see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/1047/ 
104704.htm (accessed 21 May 2015). 
13
 [2013] EWCA Crim 1433. See https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/permission-to-appeal-2015-
0102.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015). 
14
 A and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622, [2011] Q.B. 841 at [9-10]; Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 
1 A.C. 827 at [93]. See also CPS Guidance on: Joint Enterprise Charging Decisions, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/assets/uploads/files/Joint_Enterprise.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015). 
15
 B. Krebs, “Joint Criminal Enterprise” (2010) 73(4) M.L.R. 578-604. On this understanding of how 
the concepts of co-perpetration, aiding & abetting and joint enterprise relate to one another, there are 
only two ways in which an individual can become complicit in someone else’s crime: joint perpetration 
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currently understood is very low in that the accomplice is convicted on the basis of 
foresight alone. In contrast to a co-perpetrator or ‘ordinary’ accessory (who aids, 
abets, counsels or procures P’s crime), those charged under the doctrine of joint 
enterprise will not have actively participated in or assisted or encouraged the 
commission of P’s crime B. If joint enterprise is an independent head of liability, it 
thus threatens to subvert the stricter requirements of the other two heads of liability 
(which require active involvement with intent and knowledge of the essentials of the 
crime). If it is not an independent head of liability, but forms part of aiding and 
abetting and co-perpetration, it waters down the requirements of these forms of 
participation. On either view, the doctrine of joint enterprise is problematic because it 
sets the threshold for conviction lower in the case of the killer’s associate than in the 
case of the actual killer.
16
 In other words, it is easier to prove murder against the 
person who just stood by and watched than the person who struck the fatal blow. The 
principle leads to particularly harsh results in the context of murder because of the 
mandatory life sentence for those who are convicted of this offence.
17
 
In 2003, Antje Pedain suggested that a concept of endorsement might be 
helpful in understanding the conception of intention in the law of murder and 
presented a powerful argument that such an approach was already evident in Lord 
Hailsham’s speech in Hyam.18 She argued that intention in its primary sense of 
purpose and in its secondary sense of foresight of a consequence as virtually certain, 
rather than being conceptually independent, have a common denominator in that they 
                                                                                                                                           
and aiding & abetting. Joint enterprise only comes into play to determine the scope of either head of 
liability. In this, it fulfils a necessary and important function. 
16
 See Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 131, Assiting and Encouraging Crime (1993), para 
[2.123]; M. Dyson, “More appealing joint enterprise” (2010) C.L.J. 425. 
17
 B. Crewe and others, “Joint enterprise: the implications of an unfair and unclear law” [2015] Crim. 
L.R. 252, 255-268. 
18
 A. Pedain, “Intention and the Terorrist Example” [2003] Crim. L.R. 579, 593. 
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both ‘signal prior endorsement of the outcome by the actor, leaving no room for the 
actor to meaningfully disassociate himself from the outcome once it has 
materialised.’19 Using Woollin20 – a despairing father threw his crying baby son 
towards his pram, causing him to hit a hard surface, thus suffering fatal injuries – as 
an example, Pedain explained that ‘[t]he reason why we allow Woollin to distance 
himself from the foreseeable consequences of his actions is that he did not endorse 
injury or death even as a possibility. We allow him to deny endorsement, which we 
may not be prepared to do in any case of merely possible as opposed to virtually 
certain consequences.’21 
Though widely cited, the idea put forward in her paper is still awaiting 
recognition by the courts. It may well be that it was either ahead of its time, or too 
ambitious, or both. I would like to argue that a similar suggestion might well fall on 
more fertile ground in the context of joint enterprise. The secondary party is not 
himself ‘wielding the knife’; in fact, there is little, if any, causative link between his 
conduct and the victim’s death: it is typical of joint enterprise situations that while S 
has participated with P in the commission of one particular offence (crime A), the 
killing (crime B) is carried out by P without any further acts of assistance or 
encouragement on S’s part.22 It may therefore be easier for a court to move from a 
foresight to an endorsement test in this more limited context than in the general law of 
murder – which is not to say that such a more radical step might not be taken in due 
course. 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., at 586. 
20
 [1999] 1 A.C. 82 (HL). 
21
 A. Pedain, “Intention and the Terorrist Example” [2003] Crim. L.R. 579, 586. 
22
 G.R. Sullivan, “The Law Commission Consultation Paper on complicity: Part 2: Fault elements and 
joint enterprise” [1994] Crim. L.R. 252, 261. See also G. Virgo, “Joint enterprise liability is dead: long 
live accessorial liability” [2012] Crim. L.R. 850, 858-860. 
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In the joint enterprise context, an endorsement-based approach might reduce 
the risks of uncertainty and inconsistency
23
 that stem from the possibility that, under 
the law as it stands, some juries may limit their deliberations strictly to the foresight 
criterion whilst others may take a more holistic approach in assessing the defendant’s 
mental state. It would also bring the relevant mens rea standard (some form of 
subjective recklessness)
24
 closer to one of intention and thus alleviate concerns that 
the current law may be over-inclusive and setting the hurdle for conviction too low, 
especially where S is charged with crimes such as murder that for P require proof of 
intent:
25
 the underlying idea of endorsement is that it is ultimately S’s accepting mind-
set (when it comes to crime B) that is reprehensible and attracts blame, not the fact 
that S had a (possibly fleeting) realisation of the fatality as such (coupled with the fact 
of his continued participation in crime A). S’s accepting mind-set, in other words, 
supplies the necessary mental element to settle him with liability as an accessory to or 
joint perpetrator of crime B. Such endorsement might manifest itself, for example, by 
S communicating his assent to third parties before or during the commission of crime 
B;
26
 by showing acquiescence or reconciliation (falling short of encouragement)
27
 to 
                                                 
23
 The House of Commons Justice Committee heard (anecdotal) evidence to the effect that the current 
law is applied inconsistently. But as its report points out, this evidence is difficult to verify in the 
absence of official statistics. The Committee has recommended that the relevant data be collected in 
future, see House of Commons Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise – Eleventh Report of Session 2010-
12, vol I (HC 1597, 2012) 3 at pp. 10-11. 
24
 Powell [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 14 (Lord Steyn). S’s mental state, falling short of intention (even in the 
oblique sense) must be one of subjective recklessness. However, it can be doubted whether this 
amounts to Cunnigham-recklessness. Jury directions focus on S’s foresight; foresight is not 
synonymous with recklessness in the Cunningham-sense which requires the defendant consciously to 
have taken an unreasonable risk. This latter limb is conspicuously absent in cases decided under joint 
enterprise principles. See also A. Ashworth and J. Horder, Principles of Criminal Law, 7th ed. (Oxford 
2013) at p. 439: ‘Thus the basis of joint enterprise liability is now a restricted form of (subjective) 
recklessness, similar in spirit to the Maxwell decision’. 
25
 On these and related concerns see most recently The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Joint 
Enterprise – An investigation into the legal doctrine of joint enterprise in criminal convictions (April 
2014) at pp. 23-31.   
26
 E.g. text messages sent from the scene of crime B. 
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the foreseen consequences;
28
 or by evidence of subsequent approval, either verbal or 
conclusive, from which endorsement at the time the crime was committed can be 
inferred.
29
 
Ultimately, it is hoped that the suggested approach might produce fewer 
controversial convictions: the prosecution would need to persuade the jury that S 
acted with a particular blameworthy mind-set, in addition to having participated in 
crime A with foresight of the relevant risk, the commission of crime B. Since it seems 
unlikely that legislative reform of the law on participation-in-crime will be achieved 
any time soon,
30
 the proposed modification of the mental element in joint criminal 
enterprise would have the additional benefit that it can be put into practice through 
evolution of the common law, as will be explained below. 
This paper will first set out the current mens rea element in joint enterprise 
and briefly reiterate how it can lead to inconsistency, incoherence and injustice. The 
main part of the article puts forward the suggested alternative of focusing on S’s 
attitude (endorsement) towards P’s further crime as opposed to his mere foresight of 
that crime and explains why this would be preferable to the law as it stands. It 
considers possible objections to such a development and explains how these might be 
overcome. The paper concludes that in some of the seminal cases on joint enterprise 
the law has come surprisingly close to an endorsement-focussed approach which 
might therefore be adopted by the courts without legislative intervention. 
                                                                                                                                           
27
 Arguably, Odegbune [2013] EWCA Crim 711 is a case of this kind: although S had orchestrated the 
event (a fight between rival groups), he was chasing another boy at the time of the murder and so did 
not actually encourage the killing of V. However, it is arguable that his overall conduct shows not just 
foresight, but endorsement of the possibility of the fight turning lethal. 
28
 E.g. filming of P’s commission of crime B. 
29
 For an example see Broda (CA, 25 March 2015, unreported): S bought Ps a beer after the assault. 
30
 See above, n 12. 
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II. THE BLUNT TOOL OF THE FORESIGHT TEST 
Where joint enterprise principles are brought into play,
31
 the applicable mens rea 
standard will, in essence, be one of foresight [of P’s murder] (rather than foresight 
plus an intention to aid & abet [P’s murder], normally required to prove aiding & 
abetting, or intention [to inflict really serious harm], normally required to support a 
charge of principalship):
32
 while the Supreme Court stressed in Gnango that mens rea 
in joint enterprise actually requires both ‘a common33 intention to commit crime A’ 
and foresight by S of the possibility that P might commit crime B,
34
 the common 
intention to commit crime A is usually not hard to find.
35
 Liability for S thus 
essentially turns on whether the jury believes he had foresight of P’s commission of 
crime B. This is an unsatisfactory standard of assessing liability in joint enterprise 
                                                 
31
 The Court of Appeal suggests that there are three categories of case in which resort is had to the term 
joint enterprise, see A and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622, [2011] Q.B. 841 (CA) at [7], 845 (Hughes 
LJ): ‘(i) Where two or more people join in committing a single crime, in circumstances where they are, 
in effect, all joint principals (...). (ii) Where D2 aids and abets D1 to commit a single crime (...). (iii) 
Where D1 and D2 participate together in one crime (crime A) and in the course of it D1 commits a 
second crime (crime B) which D2 had foreseen he might commit.’ Likewise Toulson LJ in Stringer 
[2011] EWCA Crim 1396, [2012] Q.B. 160 (CA) at [57]. D. Ormerod (ed) subdivides these categories 
still further and identifies five joint enterprise situations: see Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th 
ed. (Oxford 2011) at p. 213. There is thus no settled taxonomy of joint enterprise cases. See also R. 
Fortson QC, “Inchoate Liability and the Part 2 Offences under the Serious Crime Act 2007” in A. Reed 
and M. Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime – Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Farnham, 
Surrey, UK; Burlington, VT 2013) 173 at p. 202: ‘[I]t is doubtful that there is consensus among 
criminal law practitioners as to what “joint enterprise” means.’  
32
 Kirby J in Clayton v The Queen (2006) 168 A. Crim. R. 174 at [63]. 
33
 This choice of terminology – common rather than joint intention – is potentially misleading: a joint 
enterprise requires concerted action on the basis of an understanding that is shared between the actors. 
To describe an intention as common (to two or more actors) might suggest that it can be held 
concurrently, i.e. individually, without one actor being aware that the other has the same intention. 
34
 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 A.C. 827 (SC) at [42] (Lord Phillips and Lord Judge). 
35
 See for example Badza [2009] EWCA Crim 2695 at [32-33]: Sir Anthony May described the joint 
enterprise as ‘a late night outing together which, as the appellant must have foreseen, might result in 
their participation in violence during which [the principal offender] (...) might use the knife 
aggressively with the requisite intent for murder.’ Such a loosely circumscribed venture (crime A) is 
not a particularly strong candidate to bear the load of S’s conviction, especially where P’s offence 
(crime B) constitutes murder. In fairness to his Lordship, it becomes clear later in his judgment that he 
does not think that a ‘late night outing’, not being criminal in itself, can ever constitute ‘crime A’ for 
the purposes of joint enterprise. The quote nevertheless demonstrates that we are on a slippery slope. It 
does indeed not take much to infer an agreement to commit a crime, and this becomes clear in the 
judge’s directions to the jury expressly approved by his Lordship. Thus, the judge said that ‘agreement 
to commit an offence may arise on the spur of the moment. Nothing needs to be said at all. An 
agreement can be inferred from the behaviour of the parties’. 
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cases, because in contrast to (straightforward) cases of (co-) perpetration or aiding & 
abetting, S has neither contributed to the actus reus of the offence he is charged with, 
nor has he directly
36
 helped with or encouraged that crime.
37
 The mental element – 
foresight of a possibility – thus has to do all the work linking S to P’s crime B. The 
rather undemanding actus reus stage
38
 is not counter-balanced, as one might have 
expected, by a particularly demanding mens rea requirement. Apart from concerns 
that the prosecution’s case of foresight may be made on the basis of rather weak 
evidence (turning on signs of association and gang membership),
39
 which do not 
concern the (in)adequacy of the substantive legal rules with which this paper is 
concerned, the foresight criterion on its own fails to make some (morally) significant 
distinctions which the law, arguably, ought to reflect.
40
 One possible consequence is 
that participants that are very much on the periphery of events are treated on a par 
with the main perpetrators.
41
 Where crimes of violence are concerned (as is usually 
the case where joint enterprise is invoked), escalation is always a possible, and hence 
                                                 
36
 Although the mere fact that S participated in crime A when he had foresight of crime B being 
possibly committed by his associate is said to amount to assistance and encouragement of crime B. 
37
 In Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516 at [18-23] and Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 
1396, [2012] Q.B. 160 at [47-51] Toulson LJ suggested that in such cases, S’s liability is based on a 
broad concept of causation. 
38
 An implied agreement between P and S to commit crime A seems to suffice. 
39
 See evidence given by Tim Moloney QC and Simon Natas, cited in House of Commons Justice 
Committee, Joint Enterprise – Eleventh Report of Session 2010-12, vol I (HC 1597, 2012) at p. 8. The 
CPS Guidance on: Joint Enterprise Charging Decisions, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/assets/uploads/files/Joint_Enterprise.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015), issued 
in December 2012 in response to concerns raised in front of the House of Commons Justice 
Committee, now states that ‘without some participation by D (…) association with or membership of a 
group or gang’ is insufficient to support a charge of joint enterprise (at [36]) and that ‘D’s association 
with P or a gang cannot, on its own, make D complicit in a joint enterprise’ (at [46]). However, 
according to [48-49] ‘[t]here are many ways in which D’s links with P or a group or gang can form part 
of the circumstantial evidence in a case. (…) Where such association evidence is relied on, the 
circumstances of the association of D with P, together with the other evidence in the case, must give 
rise to the inference that D was assisting or encouraging P’s offence.’ 
40
 On the (contested) idea that criminal liability is to be ascribed in accordance with moral 
responsibility, see R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency & Criminal Liability (Oxford 1990) at pp. 103-104 
(with reference to R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishment (Cambridge 1986) chs 3-4). 
41
 See the case studies in The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Joint Enterprise – An investigation 
into the legal doctrine of joint enterprise in criminal convictions (April 2014) at pp. 19-31. 
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foreseeable, consequence. It is thus difficult for a defendant to escape liability on the 
basis that he did not actually foresee that the harm anticipated might result in much 
greater, and ultimately fatal, harm. We may feel that someone who does not 
disassociate himself from violent events before they turn really nasty is rightly caught 
by the net of liability if death results (even though not at his, but someone else’s 
hands). But is this true under all circumstances? And is it right to hold him liable for 
murder, carrying a mandatory life sentence?  
S may have quite different reasons for his continued association with the 
enterprise: 
(1) Maybe he genuinely, albeit naively, believes that his presence might help to 
avoid the worst, in the sense that he trusts his being there might have a 
moderating influence on others, although he can foresee that there is still a 
(significant) risk that one of his associates may do V serious harm. 
(2) Maybe he does not care what happens, does not care whether the potential 
victim, V, lives or dies. 
(3) Maybe he desires events to unfold as they then do. 
In all these instances, he remains associated with the enterprise, and does so with the 
requisite level of foresight (of death as a possibility)
42
; yet his attitude towards the 
harm foreseen differs markedly in the three scenarios: 
(1) In the first instance, S remains involved precisely because he wants to reduce 
the likelihood that V is seriously hurt. 
(2) In the second example, S is indifferent as to whether V is caused serious harm 
or not. 
                                                 
42
 Some raise the question whether the foresight element does even have to relate to death as opposed 
to acts committed by P with the intention of killing or causing GBH by those acts, see W. Wilson and 
D. Ormerod, “Simply harsh to fairly simple: joint enterprise reform” [2015] Crim. L.R. 3, 5-6. 
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(3) In the final scenario, S positively wants V to be seriously harmed. 
People generally would think worse of S in scenario (2) than in scenario (1), and still 
worse in scenario (3). The intuitively recognised differences in attitude reflect 
differences in moral culpability, which, it is suggested, ought to translate to 
differences in criminal responsibility.  
There may be cases in which the same evidence suggests both that S clearly 
foresaw the ensuing violence and that he was not ‘okay’ with it. They demonstrate 
particularly clearly that focusing on foresight alone cannot be correct. P and S agree 
to ‘torch’ some cars. P has a propensity for violence and usually carries a knife, as S 
knows, but using violence is not part of their plan. The two succeed in setting alight a 
Mercedes and are in the process of ‘torching’ a BMW when a local resident, V, comes 
upon the scene and threatens to call the police. Fearing apprehension, P fatally stabs 
V. What impact on S’s liability would the following alternative findings have?  
 (1) S was happy to come along even though he foresaw the risk that someone 
might get hurt. 
 (2) S only agreed to come along if P promised that no one would get hurt. 
It is clear that there is more evidence of foresight in scenario (2) than in scenario (1). 
At the same time, S’s (moral) culpability is lower in the second case than in the first. 
This is because extracting the promise from P that no one will get hurt is good 
evidence not just of foresight (that P may hurt someone) but also of the attitude that S 
has towards the harm caused by P. In the second example, S does not want anyone to 
be harmed; in the first example, he is indifferent to harm being caused: S is ‘happy’ to 
come along, although he can foresee that P’s propensity for violence might result in 
someone being injured. S’s attitude (of ‘so be it’) towards the fatal outcome produced 
by P is blameworthy, not his foresight of the fatality as such (albeit coupled with the 
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fact that he remains associated with P). The two cases illustrate a morally relevant 
distinction which the current law does not acknowledge: as soon as S foresees that P 
might kill with the requisite murderous intention, he is put on a par with P and 
becomes liable to a conviction for murder should P indeed kill with the requisite 
intention (i.e. with foresight of grievous bodily harm or death as a virtual certain 
consequence of his, P’s, actions);43 the alternative of a manslaughter conviction44 is 
currently only relevant where S foresees violence on P’s part, but does not expect him 
to harbour murderous intentions in the Woollin-sense. Assuming S does indeed 
contemplate that P might act with lethal mens rea in the two situations described 
above, the current law would allow a jury to convict him of murder in both instances. 
Such an outcome seems fundamentally unjust,
45
 even if we take into account that in 
scenario (2) S is not entirely innocent: he has demonstrated a less than full 
commitment to the avoidance of harm;
46
 if he wanted to err on the safe side, he could 
have chosen to stay behind. However, he is not on a par with the actual killer: to be 
convicted of murder, a person needs to cause death with intention (at least) to do 
really serious personal injury. S’s contribution (if any) does not amount to a but for 
                                                 
43
 Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 A.C. 129 at [36] (Lord Rodger). 
44
 While Powell [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL), which was not entirely clear on this point, has been taken to 
mean that joint enterprise is an all or nothing approach (resulting either in a murder conviction or 
acquittal) – for a recent example see Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516 at [21]-[22], [38] 
(Toulson LJ) – Carpenter [2011] EWCA Crim 2568, [2012] Q.B. 722 (CA) now clarifies that in 
appropriate cases the defendant may still be charged with murder and manslaughter in the alternative. 
This is in line with dicta in Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930, which was heard in the Court of Appeal 
after Powell, and reconfirms pre-Powell Court of Appeal decisions such as Roberts [2001] EWCA 
Crim 1594, which support the view that someone, who takes part in an joint venture realising that this 
will involve some degree of violence, will usually be guilty of (unlawful dangerous act) manslaughter 
(or murder, if he had the requisite mens rea), if death results. 
45
 Likewise Kirby J in Clayton v The Queen (2006) 168 A. Crim. R. 174 at [98]. See also R. Fortson 
QC, “Inchoate Liability and the Part 2 Offences under the Serious Crime Act 2007” in A. Reed and M. 
Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime – Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Farnham, Surrey, 
UK; Burlington, VT 2013) 173 at p. 203: ‘[I]t is submitted that persons ought not to be stigmatised as 
“murderers”, and sentenced as such, on mere foresight of what another might do.’ 
46
 G.R. Sullivan, “Participating in crime: Law Com No 305 – Joint criminal ventures” [2008] Crim. 
L.R. 19, 29. 
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cause of the victim’s death, nor does his level of foresight of murder as a possibility 
allow for a finding of intention in the Woollin-sense. 
 That S’s culpability in joint enterprise situations rarely equals P’s was 
acknowledged by the late Lord Mustill in his speech in Powell.
47
 Moreover, his 
Lordship was unhappy that the foresight test ties itself into (conceptual) knots over 
scenario 2 of the ‘car torching’ example. Thus he said:  
In one particular situation there is, however, a problem which [joint 
enterprise] cannot solve. Namely, where S foresees that P may go too 
far; sincerely wishes that he will not, and makes this plain to P; and yet 
goes ahead, either because he hopes for the best, or because P is an 
overbearing character, or for some other reason. Many would say, and 
I agree, that the conduct of S is culpable, although usually at a lower 
level than the culpability of the principal who actually does the deed. 
Yet try as I may, I cannot accommodate this culpability within a 
concept of joint enterprise. How can a jury be directed at the same time 
that S is guilty only if he was party to an express or tacit agreement to 
do the act in question, and that he is guilty if he not only disagreed 
with it, but made his disagreement perfectly clear to P? Are not the two 
assertions incompatible?
48
 
It is certainly true that the two assertions are contradictory; nonetheless, under the law 
as it stands, such a case would be covered by the joint enterprise doctrine. As Lord 
Rodger confirmed in Rahman if ‘B contemplates that A may take a gun and use it in 
                                                 
47
 [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 11: ‘Many would say, and I agree, that the conduct of S is culpable, although 
usually at a lower level than the culpability of the principal who actually does the deed.’ 
48
 Powell [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 11. 
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the course of the attack on the victim [then], even if B is vehemently opposed to the 
use of a gun and tries to dissuade A from carrying one, nevertheless, if, being aware 
of the risk, B takes part in the joint assault, he will be guilty of murder if A shoots the 
victim’.49  In covering this case, joint enterprise is not just over-inclusive50 and 
counter-intuitive, it is also conceptually unsound. 
 The problem is compounded by the rule that, in English law, duress is not a 
defence to murder.
51
 Returning to our ‘car torching’ example, imagine a young, 
aspiring member of the ‘car torching’ gang who is seriously worried about himself 
becoming a victim if he refuses to come along when it becomes clear that violence 
against people rather than cars is very much on the cards. The current foresight test 
renders him liable to be convicted of murder, and the fact that he was, or believed that 
he was, under duress in failing to disassociate himself from the violence that ensued 
will not assist him. Such a case of coercion would be a fortiori the case mentioned by 
Lord Mustill in which S only stays on the scene because P is an ‘overbearing 
character’.52 It may be just about arguable that a person who himself actively brought 
about another person’s death, or actively assisted another in killing, should be barred 
from the defence if he did so under coercion.
53
 I would argue that it is quite a different 
                                                 
49
 Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 A.C. 129 at [36]. 
50
 Similar in outcome, if not reasoning, G. Virgo in “Joint enterprise liability is dead: long live 
accessorial liability” [2012] Crim. L.R. 850, 862: ‘[S] should not then be convicted of crime B, because 
his explicit rejection of it means that he is not associated with it.’ See also B. Mitchell, “Participating in 
Homicide” in A. Reed and M. Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime – Domestic and Comparative 
Perspectives (Farnham, Surrey, UK; Burlington, VT 2013) 7 at p. 13: ‘Supporters [of an increased 
dangerousness rationale for joint enterprise liability] would presumably argue that if [S] and P agree 
that a burglary be committed and, having expressed his opposition to any violence, [S] continues with 
the venture, he cannot then exclude his liability for violence because he still chose to take the risk (that 
the level of criminality might increase). The problem with this argument is that it is too open-ended.’ 
51
 Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL); Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412 (HL). 
52
 Powell [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 11. 
53
 Though the Law Commission notes that ‘[a]lmost all our consultees were agreed that duress should 
be a defence to murder in some manner or form’, see Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide – Project 
6 of the Ninth Programme of Law Reform: Homicide (Law Com No 304, 2006), para. [1.56]. 
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thing to find someone who was merely on the periphery of events and not actively 
involved guilty of murder in circumstances where he remained at the scene out of fear 
or intimidation.   
III. FORESIGHT PLUS ENDORSEMENT? 
Arguably the law on joint enterprise would be less controversial (and fewer cases 
might reach the appellate courts) if it allowed for more subtle distinctions to be drawn 
when it comes to S’s mind-set.54 This might be achieved if, in assessing the 
defendant’s mental state, the focus shifted from foresight of the consequences 
(cognitive standard) to foresight plus endorsement of the consequences foreseen 
(cognitive-volitional standard). In what follows, I will explore what such an approach 
might look like and how it would fit in with the general framework of the common 
law.
55
 It will be argued that an attitude-oriented approach towards assessing mens rea 
in joint enterprise might already be within interpretative reach of the common law: 
some (pre-Powell) cases can be read as presaging an element of approval or 
endorsement as to P’s conduct (which S has foreseen as a possible incident to their 
joint venture), while more recent ones are at least ambiguous on this point. Indeed, it 
is arguable that, in the same way that foresight (albeit in the degree of virtual 
                                                 
54
 It might be objected that introducing greater subtleties into the jury direction will lead to more scope 
for appeals. However, ultimately this is an argument premised on an inherent lack of confidence in the 
jury system. The Law Commission has recently consistently proposed that more gradations of criminal 
culpability should be introduced. It could also be argued that the recent abundance of appeals from 
joint enterprise convictions is a function of a (possibly rightly) perceived mismatch between the crude 
test of foresight and the ordinary person’s intuitive moral judgment. It might also be objected that 
differences in responsibility should be dealt with at the sentencing rather than conviction stage. This 
raises a more general issue of criminal law – why have gradations of responsibility reflected at the 
offence stage at all (eg murder versus manslaughter) rather than dealing with them at the sentencing 
stage? 
55
 On the significance of one’s attitude to one’s actions, see also e.g. R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency & 
Criminal Liability (Oxford 1990) at pp. 149, 157-173 (recklessness as ‘practical indifference’) and the 
discussion of Duff’s view in A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History – A Critical Introduction to 
Criminal Law (London 1993) at pp. 71-72.  
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certainty) can be used as evidence of intention in the general law of murder,
56
 
foresight (of crime B) in the context of joint enterprise is similarly used to infer 
approval or endorsement on the part of S. The problem is that this has been lost sight 
of, as will be explained below, with foresight taking on a life of its own as a 
substantive rather than an evidential role.
57
  
 The starting point for our analysis is the realisation that statements about the 
mental element in joint enterprise do not speak with one voice;
58
 they are, at least, 
ambivalent on what exactly is required. As such, there are some cases which, in 
establishing S’s liability, have focussed (almost) exclusively on whether S 
contemplated or foresaw that P might commit crime B as a possibility.
59
 Others, by 
contrast, seem to have required such foresight plus an additional element (such as 
‘agreement’60, ‘authorisation’61 or ‘wrongful participation in face of a known risk’62) 
which, arguably, connotes endorsement, not just contemplation, of the foreseen 
offence. Most cases, however, appear equivocal on the issue, in that they contain 
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 See Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL); Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192, [2003] 2 Cr. 
App. R. 30 at [43-45] (Rix LJ): ‘In our judgment, however, the law has not yet reached a definition of 
intent in murder in terms of appreciation of a virtual certainty… .’ 
57
 See also D.J. Baker, “Foresight in Common Purpose Complicity/Joint Enterprise Complicity: It Is a 
Maxim of Evidence, Not a Substantive Fault Element” (Draft Chapter 2013/14: Reinterpreting 
Criminal Complicity, Forthcoming), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507529 (accessed 21 
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 Likewise G. Virgo, House of Commons Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise – Eleventh Report of 
Session 2010-12, vol I (HC 1597, 2012) at p. 8. 
59
 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 A.C. 827 (SC) at [42] (Lord Phillips and Lord Judge): 
‘[L]iability arises where (i) D1 and D2 have a common intention to commit crime A (ii) D1, as an 
incident of committing crime A, commits crime B, and (iii) D2 had foreseen the possibility that he 
might do so’. 
60
 Wakely [1990] Crim. L.R. 119. 
61
 Chan Wing-siu [1985] A.C. 168 (PC) 175 (Sir Robin Cooke). 
62
 Powell [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 11 (Lord Mustill). 
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statements – usually framed in terms of (continued) participation in the criminal 
enterprise ‘with’ or ‘despite’ foresight – which could be read to support either of the 
aforementioned positions: the issue boils down to whether or not S’s (continued) 
participation in the joint enterprise – which comprises the actus reus element – also 
has a mens rea dimension (going beyond cognition): it might imply volition on S’s 
part, in the sense that by having chosen to participate despite foresight S demonstrates 
not just a willingness to run the risk of further wrongdoing by P, but some 
endorsement of the consequences foreseen as possibly resulting from P’s actions. In A 
and others, for instance, the Court of Appeal said: ‘the liability of D2 in the third type 
of joint enterprise scenario (...) rests (...) on his having continued in the common 
venture of crime A when he realises (even if he does not desire) that crime B may be 
committed in the course of it.’63 Arguably, the focus here is as much on foresight (= 
cognitive element) as it is on S’s decision (= volitional element) to remain a 
participant in the common criminal endeavour, so that it would not be fair to say that 
S is held to account on the basis of his foresight alone. Rather, S may here be held to 
account for his decision to remain in the enterprise, a decision which is not just 
constitutive of a willingness to run the risk of a harm foreseen – in which case it 
would still be difficult to explain why that should be sufficient to constitute the mens 
rea for murder – but, arguably, is constitutive of S’s reconciliation to such harm. Such 
an understanding would go beyond recklessness (in its traditional common law 
sense), and whilst not amounting to intention in the common law sense either, might 
at least bring S’s responsibility closer to one for intentional conduct.  
However, there are statements in two House of Lords decisions which seem to 
suggest that the current law is built around an entirely foresight-centred approach to 
                                                 
63
 A and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622, [2011] Q.B. 841 at [27], 850 (Hughes LJ). Similarly 
Sanghera [2012] EWCA Crim 16, [2012] 2 Cr. App. R. 17 at [90] (Aikens LJ). 
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establishing S’s liability. Thus, in Powell, the House of Lords concluded that ‘it is 
sufficient to found a conviction for murder for a secondary party to have realised that 
in the course of the joint enterprise the primary party might kill with intent to do so or 
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.’64 Similarly, Lord Bingham said in the 
subsequent decision in Rahman that ‘the touchstone [of joint enterprise liability] is 
one of foresight.’65 Calling foresight ‘sufficient’ and ‘the touchstone of liability’ 
suggests that the doctrine of joint enterprise, at present, does not require a volitional 
mens rea element – and, indeed, no mens rea ingredient other than foresight – to 
establish S’s liability.  
Lord Steyn, in Powell, was particularly explicit that we need look no further 
than what S contemplated to found liability:  
[F]oresight is a necessary and sufficient ground of the liability of 
accessories. That is how the law has been stated in two carefully 
reasoned decisions of the Privy Council: see Chan Wing-Sui [sic] v. 
The Queen [1985] A.C. 168 and Hui Chi-ming v. The Queen [1992] 1 
A.C. 34.
66 
Indeed, some passages in Chan Wing-siu
67
 lend support to Lord Steyn’s proposition 
that ‘foresight is a necessary and sufficient ground’ of liability. Thus, Sir Robin 
Cooke said in that case:  
It is what the individual accused in fact contemplated that matters. (...) 
The prosecution must prove the necessary contemplation beyond 
                                                 
64
 [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 27 (Lord Hutton). 
65
 Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 A.C. 129 at [11], [21]. Likewise Lord Neuberger at [103]. 
66
 [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 13 (emphasis added). 
67
 [1985] A.C. 168 (PC). 
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reasonable doubt, although that may be done by inference as just 
mentioned. If, at the end of the day and whether as a result of hearing 
evidence from the accused or for some other reason, the jury conclude 
that there is a reasonable possibility that the accused did not even 
contemplate the risk, he is in this type of case not guilty of murder or 
wounding with intent to cause serious bodily harm.
68
 
However, an earlier passage indicates that Sir Robin Cooke may here have been using 
the expression ‘contemplation’ with a rather specific meaning: 
That there is [a principle of joint enterprise] is not in doubt. It turns on 
contemplation or, putting the same idea in other words, authorisation, 
which may be express but is more usually implied. It meets the case of 
a crime foreseen as a possible incident of the common unlawful 
enterprise. The criminal culpability lies in participating in the venture 
with that foresight.
69
 
In this passage, ‘contemplation’ is equated with ‘authorisation’,70 a term that seems to 
require more than just foresight: ‘authorisation’ implies approval, sanction or 
endorsement of the acts and consequences foreseen. Arguably, the way that 
‘authorisation’ is further linked (‘it meets the case of...’) with ‘participating’ suggests 
that the expression ‘participation’ is here used as shorthand for a participation that 
gives rise to an inference of approval: in continuing to participate, the defendant 
shows that he has authorised (in the sense of approving or deciding to live with) the 
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 [1985] A.C. 168 (PC) 177-78. 
69
 [1985] A.C. 168 (PC) 175 (emphasis added). 
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 A point also noted in Hui Chi-ming [1992] 1 A.C. 34 (PC) 53 (Lord Lowry). But see A. Ashworth 
and J. Horder, Principles of Criminal Law, 7th ed. (Oxford 2013) at p. 438: ‘The element of prior 
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consequences. In other words, he has endorsed the potential outcome of P’s actions, if 
only to achieve some other goal. On such a reading, the very concept of 
‘participation’ would include an element of volition, and foresight, although still a 
necessary ingredient, would no longer be sufficient to ground S’s liability. 
The other case Lord Steyn cites in support of his proposition is Hui Chi-
ming.
71
 Lord Lowry delivered the advice in that case. With regard to an alleged 
misdirection concerning joint enterprise, he observed that passages in subsequent 
cases which were aimed at rewording the joint enterprise principle as enunciated in 
Chan Wing-siu had often been misleading. In particular, Lord Lowry cites with 
approval a lengthy passage from Hyde
72
 in which Lord Lane CJ disapproves of the 
statement in Wakely
73
 that ‘[t]he suggestion that a mere foresight of the real or 
definite possibility of violence being used is sufficient to constitute the mental 
element of murder is prima facie, academically speaking at least, not sufficient.’74 
Lord Lane explains that this ‘passage is not in accordance with the principles set out 
by Sir Robin Cooke which we were endeavouring to follow and was wrong, or at least 
misleading.’75 He goes on to offer the following reformulation of the joint enterprise 
principle: 
If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may 
kill or intentionally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to 
participate with A in the venture, that will amount to a sufficient 
mental element for B to be guilty of murder if A, with the requisite 
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 [1992] 1 A.C. 34 (PC). 
72
 [1991] 1 Q.B. 134 (CA). 
73
 [1990] Crim. L.R. 119.  
74
 [1992] 1 A.C. 34 (PC) 50 (Lord Lowry citing Lord Lane CJ in Hyde [1991] 1 Q.B. 134 (CA) 139). 
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 Ibid. 
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intent, kills in the course of the venture. As Professor Smith points out, 
B has in those circumstances lent himself to the enterprise and by so 
doing he has given assistance and encouragement to A in carrying out 
an enterprise which B realises may involve murder.
76
 
This statement is not so much restating or clarifying the passage in Chan Wing-siu as 
putting a new gloss on the joint enterprise doctrine. Evidently, ‘realisation’ is a lot 
closer to foresight than ‘contemplation’; however, the idea of the defendant having 
‘lent’ himself to the enterprise and thereby having given assistance and 
encouragement clearly requires more than foresight on the part of the defendant, and 
may require even more than ‘authorisation’: it implies that the defendant, S, has 
somehow been instrumental
77
 in the commission of P’s crime. The quoted passage 
also suggests that the defendant’s mental state must relate to his being so 
instrumental, because it requires that he deliberately lent himself to the enterprise. 
Arguably, a further passage in the judgment makes clear that the opinion in 
Hui Chi-ming is in fact ill-suited to support Lord Steyn’s proposition. Thus, further 
on, Lord Lowry says the following (about the meaning of ‘participation’): 
This was a strong case of at least tacit agreement that Ah Hung should 
be attacked accompanied by foresight, as admitted by the defendant, 
that a very serious assault might occur, even if that very serious assault 
had not been planned from the beginning. It is, moreover, easier to 
prove against an accomplice that he contemplated and by his 
participation accepted the use of extra force in the execution of the 
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 Not necessarily in the sense that S has caused crime B. 
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planned assault than it normally would be to show contemplation and 
acceptance of a new offence, such as murder added to burglary.
78
 
Lord Lowry’s words (quite clearly) suggest that the joint enterprise principle might 
originally have been built upon contemplation plus acceptance [by conduct] (ie 
participation) of the consequences foreseen. Such an acceptance clearly goes to the 
defendant’s mental state. It is thus difficult to see how Lord Steyn’s proposition that 
foresight is necessary and sufficient is supported by the reasoning in Hui Chi-ming. 
Indeed, Lord Steyn himself seems to realise that his view is not all that well supported 
by authority, for he continues at length to justify the imposition of liability in Powell 
with reference to policy and practical considerations.
79 
Bearing in mind how the Privy Council in the above cases initially associated 
‘participation’ with both ‘authorisation’ and ‘acceptance’, it might be argued that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the language of ‘authorisation’ was rejected in Powell 
(replacing it with ‘contemplation’, upon which the focus in modern cases shifted to 
foresight), the law on joint enterprise, in continuing to rely on the ‘participating with 
foresight’-formula, still has at its core an element of volition. Ultimately S might thus 
be held to account because he has endorsed, as judged by his overall behaviour, the 
consequences foreseen by him as possible to result from his companion’s actions.  
The view put forward here is admittedly not easily reconciled with the two 
House of Lords decisions in Powell and Rahman. However, I have tried to 
demonstrate that those decisions, in turning foresight from an evidential into a 
substantive requirement, are based on an unsound footing in terms of authority. The 
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Supreme Court in Jogee
80
 will have an opportunity to revisit this development. I 
would argue that, in Powell, the House of Lords took a wrong turn as a matter of 
principle and I will explain the reasons for this view in the following section.  
IV. WHY ENDORSEMENT IS PREFERABLE TO MERE FORESIGHT 
There are five good reasons why the common law might want to adopt an 
endorsement-based approach to assessing mens rea in joint enterprise situations. First, 
identifying an element of endorsement provides us with a stronger link between S’s 
conduct and P’s crime B than the foresight approach and the justifications put forward 
to defend it which place emphasis on S’s having joined P in the original enterprise. I 
will not discuss justifications based on assumption of risk, enhancement of risk, 
omissions-based liability, and change of normative position as I have considered these 
at length elsewhere,
81
 save to say that all these locate the crucial trigger for liability in 
S’s commitment to and the role he plays in the initial joint enterprise (crime A); they 
do not point to a link between S and crime B other than S’s having been involved in 
crime A with foresight of crime B. Under the endorsement approach, S would not just 
have to have foreseen the risk (of murder) and assessed it as more than negligible; the 
jury would also have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he had reconciled 
himself to his companion’s murderous intent and actions and, ultimately, the victim’s 
death. It is not doubted, of course, that foresight will have a role to play in reaching 
that conclusion, but the jury will have to consider it as part of the overall factual 
matrix. Whilst S’s murder conviction would thus still not be based on intention,82 the 
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endorsement test would raise the mens rea standard from what is currently a watered-
down version of subjective recklessness, bringing it closer to what is required to 
convict the main perpetrator. It avoids the practical difficulties connected with basing 
liability on intention, namely that intention in the Woolin-sense is difficult to prove 
against secondary parties in cases in which it is often unclear who the main 
perpetrator even was, while making convicting the secondary party more palatable 
morally. S’s involvement with crime A is now linked with crime B because of his 
reprehensible attitude towards the commission of crime B by the principal perpetrator. 
This is preferable to a link based on foresight alone, which, as explained above, does 
not provide a moral connection between S and crime B.  
The second good reason for preferring an endorsement-based approach to the 
current law is that it would make the basis of S’s conviction intellectually sounder, in 
that endorsement can actually explain why S is to be held responsible for what is 
essentially P’s crime: by his endorsement of crime B, the scope of the enterprise 
(crime A) is extended, so that S now has participated in a venture that includes P’s 
further wrongdoing. In other words, the joint enterprise to which S is a party consists 
of both crime A and crime B. Endorsement thus furnishes the vital criterion by which 
the jury can decide whether the killing formed part of P’s and S’s common plan or 
purpose, so that it can then, justifiably, be attributed to S. If, for instance, in my ‘car 
torching gone wrong’- example, S had continued to set fire to other cars after P had 
killed the intervener, it would be possible for the jury to infer that he had thereby 
adopted P’s act of killing.83 In contrast, had S in the same situation exclaimed ‘What 
                                                                                                                                           
(December 2014), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/ 
310/31002.htm (accessed 21 May 2015) at para [43]. 
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are you doing?’ in a voice of utter disbelief, this might be taken to indicate that he 
was not, in any sense of the word, ‘okay’ with what his companion, P, was doing, 
giving rise to an inference that he did not endorse the latter’s actions, although it 
cannot be denied that, on the facts, he had foresight that P might do just such a thing, 
knowing as he did of the presence of the knife and P’s violent disposition.  
The endorsement approach can explain S’s liability not just in joint enterprise 
scenarios (which, as we have seen, concern two crimes), but also in instances of 
‘ordinary’ aiding & abetting84 and co-perpetration (where only one crime will have 
been committed). Indeed, it is possible to argue that endorsement is the underlying 
principle of all of these forms of liability: it is required, at the very least as a 
necessary condition, in order to fix participants in crime with liability, be it because 
they encouraged another’s crime, aided in its commission or actually contributed to it. 
The approach advocated here thus, thirdly, supports the argument that joint enterprise 
is not a head of liability in its own right,
85
 but a mechanism complementing and 
underlying the ordinary rules of aiding & abetting and co-perpetration, helping to 
determine how far to cast the net of liability.
86
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Fourthly, the endorsement test is to be preferred to one looking to mere 
foresight because it excludes from the reach of the joint enterprise doctrine the case 
Lord Mustill found impossible to accommodate within a principle of liability which 
puts S on a par with P, because S’s culpability is ‘at a lower level than the culpability 
of the principal who actually does the deed’87: ‘S foresees that P may go too far; 
sincerely wishes that he will not, and makes this plain to P; and yet goes ahead 
(…).’88 In excluding this case, the joint enterprise doctrine becomes more coherent. It 
also becomes more proportionate and just in its application. This may be particularly 
relevant in cases in which S feels pressured or coerced to remain with the group 
notwithstanding, or even because, he foresees that conflict may escalate into (greater 
or even lethal) violence. The law is very clear that duress is not a defence to murder. 
An endorsement approach would solve this problem at the liability stage and might 
prevent serious injustice in such cases (by reducing S’s liability to unlawful 
dangerous act manslaughter in appropriate cases, as will be explained below).
89
  
Finally, all commentators seem to be agreed that the current test sets the 
hurdle for conviction too low, while there are fears that requiring intention would set 
the hurdle too high (in that it is impossible to prove in practice). Endorsement might 
provide a middle ground from which to work out a practicable solution. 
If, as has been argued, ‘participating with foresight’ can be construed, or at 
least developed, so as to involve an element of volition (in the sense of endorsement 
of the foreseen harmful consequences), it would be preferable to have this articulated 
openly. As it is, juries struggle to make sense of the participation requirement, as 
evidenced, for example, by Stringer where the jury sent a note to the judge asking for 
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clarification on what ‘constituted participation as defined in his summing up’.90 It is 
not obvious on an ‘ordinary English meaning’- interpretation of ‘participation’ that 
this requirement might aim for a finding that the defendant endorsed P’s crime: while 
‘participating’ may imply that the defendant chose to run a risk, it does not without 
more invite the jury to draw more far-reaching inferences as to the defendant’s 
disposition or volitional state of mind in the sense of an acceptance of or 
reconciliation to the harmful consequences of P’s crime. As William Wilson has 
pointed out, albeit in the context of homicide law reform, ‘a willingness to run risks is 
not the same as being reconciled to their outcome’,91 and it is the latter that, arguably, 
links S to P’s crime B under the doctrine of joint enterprise, not the former (which 
seems ill-suited to bear the load of a murder conviction).  
V. OBJECTIONS TO AN ENDORSEMENT-BASED MENS REA APPROACH 
It might be objected that any reform along the lines suggested in this paper raises 
practical concerns, and in particular (1) that joint enterprise in its current form is 
needed to tackle gang violence effectively, (2) that the proposed change would 
deprive the prosecution of a bargaining chip vital in securing accomplice testimony 
and/or guilty pleas, and (3) that adding an element of endorsement would make jury 
instructions too complex. Let us take them one by one.  
A. Fighting Gang Violence 
Gang violence is a serious problem and one that requires a firm and effective 
response. Where a gang kills it may not always be easy to prove who fired the fatal 
shot, guided the fatal blade or landed the fatal blow. Joint enterprise as it stands 
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makes it easy for prosecutors to avoid these problems by charging everybody 
involved with joint enterprise murder. It is therefore perceived to be a vital weapon in 
the fight against gang violence, even though its intellectual and conceptual 
shortcomings are, at least implicitly, acknowledged.
92
 
 It would, however, be a mistake to tackle problems created by gang 
membership and escalating acts of violence committed en groupe by lowering the 
requirements of participation and accessorial liability.
93
 Joint enterprise as it stands is 
a common law principle which as a matter of legal doctrine does not fit in well with 
the rest of the common law which normally insists that a defendant will only be 
punished according to his own moral culpability. Imposing a mandatory life sentence 
on a ‘non-acting co-adventurer’94 merely because he foresaw that somebody else 
might, in the course of a joint criminal act, commit a more serious crime also raises 
serious rule of law concerns, in particular as to whether such a defendant is given fair 
warning and whether his wrongdoing is fairly labelled. The issues are well-
rehearsed,
95
 and I do not want to repeat them here.  
 It is not at all obvious to me that the mens rea standard put forward in this 
paper, and designed to address the above concerns, would significantly weaken the 
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prosecution’s hand. Joint enterprise based on foresight plus endorsement would still 
not require the prosecution to prove who committed the fatal act. In struggling to 
reach a verdict, however, juries would be required to consider rather more pertinent 
and finely tuned questions than whether or not the individual gang member foresaw 
that one of their number would turn lethally violent. There might, of course, be cases 
in which the endorsement required for joint enterprise murder cannot be proved, but 
this would not mean that S would escape liability altogether: following the Court of 
Appeal decision in Carpenter
96
 it is arguable that a participant in crime A who 
foresaw at least some harm coming to the victim can be guilty of unlawful dangerous 
act manslaughter where P ends up killing V.
97
 In most cases of gang violence the risk 
of escalation will already have been inherent in crime A.
98
 The advantage of this 
approach is that the judge will be able to sentence S according to S’s culpability rather 
than being compelled to pass a life sentence. 
B. Depriving the Prosecution of a Bargaining Chip 
Another objection that I have encountered in discussions is that the proposed 
approach would deprive the prosecution of a powerful weapon in plea bargaining 
and/or securing accomplice testimony. The idea is that the threat of being charged 
with joint enterprise murder is so powerful as to incentivise cooperation with the 
prosecution. However, the scope for guilty pleas under the current law is, perhaps, 
more limited than the general public would expect. 
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First, given that murder carries a mandatory life sentence, there is little scope 
for reducing the time to be served in consideration of a defendant pleading guilty. As 
far as the minimum prison term is concerned, the starting points are set high (whole 
life, 30 years, 25 years, 15 years, 12 years, depending on a number of criteria set out 
in Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) and the maximum discount a 
defendant can expect in exchange for a guilty plea is one sixth of the minimum 
term.
99
 
Secondly, para 60 of the 2012 CPS Guidance on Joint Enterprise Charging 
Decisions appears to bar the prosecution from threatening a defendant with joint 
enterprise in order to secure his guilty plea on a lesser charge: ‘Prosecutors should 
never go ahead with more charges than are necessary just to encourage a defendant to 
plead guilty to a few. In the same way, they should never go ahead with a more 
serious charge just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one’.100 
While the Guidelines say nothing about securing accomplice testimony, there 
must be a serious question mark over the probative value of any accomplice testimony 
thus obtained. This view might be regarded as naïve and ‘academic’ by those actually 
operating the criminal justice system. It cannot be denied that the threat of being 
charged with joint enterprise, be it express or implied, may make it more likely that 
gang members will turn on other gang members. However, it is open to doubt that 
modifying the mental element the prosecution would be required to prove along the 
lines suggested would change this very much.  
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C. Complexity of Jury Instructions 
One further obstacle to having an attitude-test of endorsement play a more prominent 
part in the mens rea of joint enterprise is the belief that the current foresight-centred 
approach alone is capable of keeping the mens rea inquiry in joint enterprise 
sufficiently simple, so that a jury comprised of non-lawyers can work with it. In Lord 
Mustill’s words: ‘What the trial judge needs is a clear and comprehensible statement 
of a workable principle (...).’ This, however, is precisely what the current law does 
not provide. One only needs to look to the number of cases
101
 that have reached the 
appellate courts in recent years because of alleged misdirections
102
 to conclude that 
jury directions turning on S’s foresight in joint enterprise cases are anything but 
uncomplicated. There is an additional problem with the supposedly simple instruction 
that foresight is sufficient for liability, and that is that different juries will take 
foresight to mean different things, with some tending to see foresight as evidence of 
endorsement, acquiescence or authorisation, and some taking the judge at his word, 
applying the foresight test literally. A little more complexity might thus not be a bad 
thing if it allows jury directions to lead to what juries may intuitively feel to be the 
just result. In fact, an analogy might be drawn with the ‘moral elbow room’ given to 
the jury by the Woollin-direction on intention with regard to finding (or denying) 
intention concerning the main perpetrator. In similar fashion, the endorsement test 
could be seen to give them an opportunity to do the morally right thing: they should 
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not find S culpable of joint enterprise murder unless they are certain beyond a 
reasonable doubt that S endorsed P’s crime B. 
A related objection might be that a refined mens rea standard incorporating an 
element of ‘endorsement’ would be too hard to translate into jury instructions (or 
‘route’ or ‘steps to verdict’), and that the relevant standard would, in any event, be too 
complex for juries to apply. However, any objection along these lines seems premised 
on the debateable assumption that questions of attitude are intrinsically harder to 
discern than questions of foresight. Arguably, in very much the same way that a 
person’s behaviour provides some insight into his cognitive state of mind, it may tell 
us something about his volitional state of mind, his feelings, his dispositions, 
including the stance taken towards any risks and consequences foreseen, so that a 
person’s attitude may in the end be no harder to determine than what he foresaw (and 
it is foresight, it should be stressed, not foreseeability,
103
 which is still the recognised 
standard of mens rea in joint criminal enterprise). Indeed, it may actually be more 
difficult to draw inferences as to a person’s cognitive state of mind than to whether he 
possessed volition: as Cathleen Kaveny has argued, ‘[t]he materials – data, insights, 
and inferential reasoning – for a judgment about a defendant’s foresight are typically 
the materials for a judgment about his intention(s), his purpose(s). Focusing on his 
foresight will typically be a mere detour, neither necessary nor even helpful in 
determining whether or not he had a murderous purpose.’104 
It may be too ambitious for an academic paper to make a definitive suggestion 
as to what a (model) jury direction on ‘endorsement’ might look like. It is clear, 
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however, that it ought to mention one vital piece of information: that endorsement 
must not be inferred from foresight (of a risk of harm) alone (although foresight might 
be indicative one way or another), because if endorsement is automatically inferred 
from foresight, nothing of substance is added to a test which looks to foresight alone.  
One might invite the jury to consider not just whether the defendant foresaw the death 
of a third party at the hands of his associate in crime as a possible incident to their 
joint criminal activity, but also how he stood in relation to the risks foreseen: as a 
matter of inference, did the defendant, on all the evidence, by his words or conduct, 
by the general nature of his behaviour, taking into account all the surrounding 
circumstances at the time of the incident, before and during its immediate aftermath, 
display a particular blameworthy attitude, namely of endorsement (in the sense of 
acquiescence, approval, or reconciliation) towards the relevant harmful 
consequences? 
If a judge, in whatever terms exactly, directs the jury to interpret the 
‘participation’ requirement in the suggested way, the majority of cases that are 
currently dealt with under the heading of joint enterprise could still be accommodated 
within the refined approach.
105
 However, the basis of any conviction would be 
stronger – and intellectually sounder – in that the endorsement approach can explain 
why S is to be held responsible for P’s crime: by his endorsement of crime B, the 
scope of the enterprise (crime A) is extended, so that S now has participated in a 
venture that includes P’s further wrongdoing. In other words, the joint enterprise to 
which S is a party consists of both crime A and crime B. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise has been criticised as unjust, over-inclusive 
and lacking both in clarity and principle, first and foremost because it allows for S to 
be convicted for a murder which P alone has committed, on the strength of S’s 
foresight of such crime as a possible incident to their joint criminal venture, when P 
himself can only be convicted for such offence if intention is proved. The foregoing 
discussion has suggested that the criticisms levelled against the doctrine and, in 
particular, its rather undemanding mens rea standard, may be alleviated if the mental 
element in joint enterprise focussed not just on S’s foresight, but also on his attitude 
vis-à-vis the consequences foreseen. On the approach here advocated, the mens rea 
inquiry would take into account whether S in fact endorsed the fatal outcome 
produced by his associate, be this by way of positive approval or by having reconciled 
himself to the foreseen consequences for the sake of achieving another goal. 
It has further been argued that, inasmuch as the prevalent mens rea 
requirement in joint enterprise is hard to pin down and leaves room for interpretation, 
such an approach might already be within interpretative reach of the common law. 
The relevant starting point would be the well-established ‘participation with 
foresight’-formula, the precise meaning of which remains, however, elusive: while it 
is commonly assumed that the mens rea standard in joint enterprise is common law 
recklessness, so that S is held liable – upon a finding of foresight and continued 
participation in the enterprise – for having chosen to run an unjustified risk of further 
wrongdoing by his associate in crime, P, the ‘participation with foresight’ element, as 
a requirement that goes to both actus reus and mens rea, seems to allow for a more 
far-reaching reading, which finds support in some pre-Powell case law. As such, the 
expression ‘participating with foresight’ might be construed (or developed) so as to 
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presage a requirement that S, by continuing to be a participant in the enterprise, has 
not just assumed the risk of P’s further wrongdoing, but has in fact endorsed P’s 
additional crime. On such a construction (or development), the joint enterprise 
doctrine would hold S to account on the basis of more than foresight of a possibility: 
S would ultimately be punished because he, in at least the weak sense of 
reconciliation, accepted the harm caused by his associate. 
While it may not prove easy to formulate an endorsement-test for the jury to 
apply to a charge of joint enterprise, it has been suggested that juries can be trusted to 
understand the complexities of such an attitude-oriented approach to mens rea, in that 
it would require them to draw inferences, on all the evidence, in much the same way 
that people generally draw inferences about other people’s feelings and mind-sets in 
everyday life, a task no harder to fulfil than determining what a person foresaw at any 
given time. 
The suggested approach, in that it links S to P’s further crime on the basis of 
S’s endorsement of P’s crime and its harmful consequences, would provide us with a 
more potent connection between S and P’s action than the current foresight test. 
Indeed, it has been briefly suggested that it may be an overarching principle which 
applies, as a necessary condition of liability, to all forms of secondary liability and co-
perpetration. At the same time, the endorsement approach would allow for an 
exclusion of cases where the doctrine, as commonly understood, appears over-
inclusive, i.e. cases where S is expressly opposed to P’s further wrongdoing, but 
continues to be associated with the original enterprise.
106
 It would also allow the jury 
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‘moral elbow room’ in cases where he remains at the scene because he is being 
coerced or because he fears reprisals from the other members of the group should he 
refuse to go along with them – a particular problem for the application of the current 
doctrine because there is not even a partial defence of duress to murder. Such 
secondary parties would not necessarily escape liability for homicide, however: it 
may well be possible to bring home a charge of dangerous unlawful act manslaughter 
on the basis that the jointly committed crime A inherently came with the risk of an 
escalation of violence. The suggested approach would thus lead to a narrowing of the 
scope of the joint enterprise doctrine, whilst putting it on a principled footing. 
Finally, while statutory reform in this area would be very welcome, it 
currently seems rather unlikely. Although the 2012 House of Commons Justice 
Committee Report on Joint Enterprise urged the Ministry of Justice to ‘take 
immediate steps to bring forward legislation’,107 successive Justice Secretaries have 
expressed little enthusiasm for taking up this advice.
108
 Any change must therefore, at 
least in the short to medium term, come from the Supreme Court, which will have an 
opportunity to reconsider the law in the upcoming appeal in the joint enterprise 
murder case of Jogee.  
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